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KANT'S SUBJ ECTIVIST THEORY OF SPACE 
MARK C. TIMMONS 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
In his 1780 Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant rejects those objec-
tivist views of space according to which space belongs to the order of 
things in themselves, either as itself a thing in itself (Newton), or re-
ducible to properties of things in themselves (Leibniz), and argues for 
a subjectivist alternative. What this subjectivist view comes to is unclear. 
This paper provides an analysis of a few key passages from the Kritik in 
an attempt to reconstruct Kant's doctrine of space. 
t t t 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues for a sub-
jectivist theory of space, and while the philosophical con-
siderations that (he thinks) necessitate such a view are made 
reasonably clear, what this subjectivist account comes to is 
unclear. Much of the unclarity is due to such expressions as 
"form of appearance," "subjective condition of sensibility," 
"outer intuition," and so on, which are constantly used by 
Kant to characterize his view. Hence, in this essay I intend to 
investigate, in some detail, the meanings of certain key terms 
and expressions, a correct understanding of which is indis-
pensible for interpreting Kant's doctrine of space. This project 
will provide, I hope, the necessary groundwork for any future 
study of Kant's theory of space. 
A clear statement of what I shall refer to as the Trans-
cendental Aesthetic doctrine of space (T.A. doctrine) reads: 
(I) Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of 
outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensi-
bility, under which alone, outer intuition is possible 
for us (A26, B42). 
First in the order of clarification is an examination of the 
relationship between the expressions "form of all appear-
ances" and "form of intuition." In the Kritik, Kant uses them 
interchangeably. This is because here the logical doctrine of 
intuition is connected with the metaphysical doctrine of 
sensibility. The logical sense of intuition serves to distinguish 
this notion from that of concept. Both are modes of knowl-
edge: by intuition a representing creature is put into an imme-
diate relation to an object, this representation being single; 
while through concepts, the subject is mediately related to 
objects by the representation of features common to several 
objects falling under the concept. The point is that intuition 
as contrasted with conception depends somehow upon an 
immediate presence of an object to consciousness. In human 
beings that faculty of intuitive awareness is sensibility. Our 
intuition, then, is sensible and depends for its operation 
upon sensory stimulation from independently existing objects .. 
The result of this sort of intuition (empirical intuition) is what 
Kant calls "appearance," the datum of possible experience 
(A 119). "Appearance," defined as "the undetermined object 
of an empirical intuition" (B34 A20), is a composite of matter 
(sensation) and form (space and time). An appearance, then, is 
that mode of consciousness in human beings through which 
we are put into an immediate relation to objects. This sort of 
connection between intuition generally and sensibility enables 
Kant to use "form of intuition" (meaning empirical intuition) 
and "form of appearance" interchangeably. 
Returning now to the above quoted passage, consider first 
the phrase "form of all appearances of outer sense." What can 
it mean to say that space is the form of anything? A clue to an 
understanding of this can be gained by considering Kant's 
talk of the forms of judgment. 
Kant defines judgments as functions of unity among 
mediate representations, i.e., concepts. A concept for Kant is 
a principle of unity by which we can represent a number of 
immediate representations (intuitions) under one representa-
tion. That is, for Kant, a concept is a rule, the use of which 
enables us to represent a number of representations imme-
diately given to us in intuition. Now all thought is judgmental, 
by which we relate or connect different concepts together 
according to certain patterns. Each pattern of connection 
represents a possible logical form for thought, which, taken 
collectively, exhaustively represents the logical structure for 
all thinking whatsoever. What this comes to is this: for any 
syntactically coherent utterance or thought, e.g., "all bodies 
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are heavy," we can abstract from its content (i.e., the predi-
cates and individual constants) and consider its form in isola-
tion, which in this case is "all---are .... " Now the structural 
features of any thought may be separated into quantity, 
quality, relation, and modality. The judgment in question is 
universal, affirmative, categorical, and assertoric, correspond-
ing respectively to these general structural features. Further, 
these features represent the most generic features of judgment 
qua judgment. The point is that to judge at all is to combine 
or relate concepts in certain patterns such that unless one's 
judgment exemplifies one of the forms, one simply has not 
offered a meaningful judgment. For Kant, then, the (logical) 
forms of thought or judgment are the limits or permissible 
ways in which one can meaningfully judge. 
Applying this to the notion "form of sensible appear-
ance," it follows that insofar as space is a form, it represents 
some sort of structure to which all sense content must con-
form if intuition is to take place at all. We might say, then, 
that space represents patterns of connection holding between 
the elements of intuitive awareness. 
Clearly, though, more is involved here. Given this much, 
Kant's view is compatible with those of both his empiricist 
and rationalist predecessors. Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, 
for instance, all hold that space is a fundamental feature of 
experience in the sense explained above, i.e., that the possi-
bility of knowledge of objects presupposes space. What makes 
Kant's view unique and interesting is the further claim that 
space, in some special sense, represents the elementary, a priori 
structure of outer appearance. Kant says that this form or 
structure is that which "so determines the manifold of appear-
ances that it allows of being ordered" (B34, A20). To under-
stand this phrase, let us turn to the second sentence of the 
quotation. 
The phrases "form of sensible appearance" and "subjec-
tive condition of sensibility" seem to be used synonymously 
in A26, B42. Consider the latter phrase. What does it mean to 
say that space is a necessary or universally-valid condition of 
sensibility? Generally, to say that something X is a necessary 
condition for something else Y is to make the counterfactual 
assertion that if X were to be removed or not to occur, then Y 
would not occur. Using this admittedly rough analysis of 
"necessary condition," we might say that if space, which has 
its seat in the mind, were to be removed, no representation of 
objects would be possible. (Presumably this would cover 
both immediate and mediate representations.) 
\ 
But again, this is quite compatible with opposing objec-
tivist theories. Newton, who held that space is an immaterial, 
independently-existing entity in which all things are placed, 
would no doubt argue that without space, human perceptual 
awareness of objects would be impossible. 
This brings us finally to the distinguishing feature of 
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Kant's doctrine: space, as a necessary condition of sensibility, 
is subjective in origin. That is, space--the structure of all 
intuitive representation in us-has its source in the human 
mind as a feature of our faculty of sensibility. Thus, from the 
foregoing we can say that, for Kant, space just is a necessary 
subjective condition of sensibility, understanding the under_ 
scored phrase in the way explained above. 
Still, matters are not as clear as they might be, for what 
sense does it make to say that space is a condition of sensible 
awareness? Again, let us assume that talking of X's being a 
necessary condition for Y can be "unpacked" counterfactu. 
ally. But the question here concerns what sort of "thing" 
this necessary condition of sensibility is. Or better (thOUgh not 
necessarily more perspicuous), what is the nature of thi! 
subjective condition called space? It seems quite peculiar t(] 
identify space with a necessary condition of some sort. 
Consider, for a moment, talk of necessary conditions 
Such talk typically arises in connection with talk of causation 
In most accounts, the relata of the causal relation are event! 
or activities. Thus, in the context of Kant's doctrine, I suggesl 
that to talk of space as a necessary condition, space must b( 
looked upon as an originally given mental activity; or better 
since it is part of our mental makeup and "exists" anteceden 
to any actual experience, space is a mental capacity. Just as, 
necessary condition for a piece of glass to shatter upon impac 
is that it must have a certain sort of capacity, i.e., to breal 
upon impact, so also we must possess the capacity of beinl 
able to represent spatially if we are to have intuitions. Morl 
precisely, space, on this account, is to be understood as , 
mental disposition, a disposition manifested as a manner 0 
arranging or combining the sensible data (sensations) givel 
through outer sense. 
This, I suggest, is the most plausible way of reading thos 
passages in the Transcendental Aesthetic in which space i 
identified as "the subjective condition under which we ca 
have outer intuition." Indeed, the foregoing should shed som 
light on Kant's definition of "form of appearance" ("that i 
which alone the sensation can be posited and ordered ... ")-
the ordering and positing being a capacity of the mind, whic 
in the case of outer sensation is called space. 
No doubt, further clarification and defense are needed il 
behalf of this interpretation. To this end, consider a numb. 
of passages that suggest this view. Speaking generally, Kar 
says: 
(2) In every being the constituent elements of it (essel 
tialius) are the matter and the mode in which the 
are combined ... (B222). 
(3) Space itself, however, is nothing but an inner mod 
of representation in which certain perceptions al 
connected with one another (B43). 
(4) ... the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our 
faculty of representation, without being anything 
more than the mode in which the subject is affected 
(B130). 
(5) The merely subjective state of the representing sub-
ject, insofar as the manifold is given in a special 
manner (for its intuiting and synthetic unity), is 
called "sensibility"; and this manner of intuition, 
given a priori, is the sensible form of intuition (Letter 
to Beck, 20 January, 1792). 
(My emphasis throughout.) 
I think the best way of understanding this talk of mode 
and manner is in terms of mental capacity or disposition, as 
explained above. 
In order to strengthen this interpretation of the doctrine, 
I turn to Kant's account of the synthesis of apprehension ex-
pounded in both A and B deductions of the categories. My 
claim will be that space (and time) function as that manner 
or way in which the imagination connects appearances in its 
apprehenSion of the empirical content of intuition. That is, 
space (and time) represent the peculiar manner in which the 
data of empirical intuition are taken up and put together 
by the imagination. Of course, to clarify this we need to ex-
plain Kant's notion of the synthesis of apprehenSion. 
Recall that sensations for Kant are the raw data of empiri-
cal intuition, i.e., the mental effects due to the affection of 
our senses by independently existing objects. As such, sensa-
tions have no extensive magnitude, i.e., are nonspatial in 
character. 
ApprehenSion by means merely of sensation occupies 
only an instant, if, that is, I do not take into account the 
succession of different sensations. As sensation is that 
element in the [field of appearance] the apprehension of 
which does not involve a succession synthesis proceeding 
from the parts to the whole representation, it has no ex-
tensive magnitude (B209). 
This passage is important and may be explained as fol-
lows. Considered in isolation, apart from the successive syn-
thesis of apprehension, sensations as such are non-extended 
magnitudes-they are intrinsically nonspatial in character. 
They are, that is, mere mental affections arising in us in a 
particular manner. If we consider sensations individually, 
our apprehension of each of them would not involve suc-
cessive synthesis and hence not be spatially extended. It is 
the successive synthesis of apprehension of sensations that 
results in the appearances-i.e., sensations plus form. Space, it 
seems, is a manner of connecting sensations to generate 
appearances. 
Appearances, then, are the result of the synthesis of 
apprehension. To substantiate this claim, consider the follow-
ing remarks. 
(7) The appearances, insofar as they are objects of con-
sciousness, simply in virtue of being representations, 
are not in any way distinct from their apprehension, 
that is, from their reception in the synthesis of 
imagination; and we must therefore agree that the 
manifold of appearances is always generated in the 
mind successively (A190). 
(8) The appearances are, in their apprehension them-
selves, nothing but an empirical synthesis in space 
and time, and are given only within this synthesis 
(A499). 
The following seems to emerge from (6) and (7): appear-
ances are initially "given" only through a certain synthesizing 
activity of the imagination. Appearances are thus the result 
of an activity of the imagination. It is the successive combining 
of sensation, which takes place in a certain manner, that 
results in appearances-the data of all knowledge. Space lies 
at the basis of this synthesis. 
This way of looking at things is further substantiated by 
remarks in the B deduction of the categories. 
(9) First of all, I may draw attention to the fact that by 
synthesis of apprehension I understand that combina-
tion of the manifold in an empirical intuition, ~here­
by perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the 
intuition (as appearances), is possible (B160). 
(10) In the representation of space and time we have a 
priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition; 
and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the 
manifold of appearance must always conform, be-
cause in no other way can the synthesis take place 
at all (B160). 
(11) When, for instance, by apprehension of the manifold 
of a house, I take the empirical intuition of it intQ a 
perception, the necessary unity of space and of outer 
sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my 
apprehension (B162). 
In (9), Kant in effect is saying that synthesis of apprehen-
sion is a combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, 
i.e., a combination of sensations which result in appearance. 
In (10) and (11), Kant is saying that space (and time) lie at 
the basis of this synthesis, i.e., as the manner in which sensa-
tions are combined. 
To sum up: We began with the phrase "form of intui-
tion," the explication of which led to an analysis of what 
Kant means in claiming that space is a subjective condition 
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of sensible intuition. We found that, originally, space is a men-
tal capacity, which on the occasion of sensible stimulation is 
the manner or mode in which the imagination combines 
appearances in what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension. 
Some brief clarifying comments are in order. One may be 
inclined to ask what precisely is this manner or mode of 
imagination identified with space. To characterize space as 
some sort of imaginative capacity for combination of sensa-
tion is mysterious. 
All that can be said here is that sensations are combined 
by the activity of the imagination in a spatial manner. One of 
the fundamental tenets of Kant's doctrine of space, first ex-
pounded in the 1768 essay "Concerning the Ultimate Founda-
tion of the Differentiation in Space," is that spatial relations 
are sui generis, i.e., not reducible to any other set of relations 
or properties of objects. Thus, all that can be said about this 
manner of combination is that it is spatial in character. 
It might be objected that, insofar as I have made space a 
capacity of the imagination, I have made the imagination a 
part of sensibility. But, as Kant says, sensibility is a receptive, 
i.e., passive faculty of knowledge; hence, the imagination, 
which functions to combine or synthesize mental data, is a 
feature of the understanding. 
Without pursuing matters too far, it is clear that the 
doctrine of imagination in Kant is obscure. It simply is not 
clear whether the imagination properly belongs to sensibility 
or the understanding, or has its feet in both. (I incline toward 
the latter view.) In Kant's Anthropology, which in part is 
Kant's psychological theory, it is interesting to note that 
imagination is in fact classified as a power of the faculty of 
sensibility. 
A connected problem may be stated as follows: Kant 
seems to hold that space and time, as forms of all sensible 
intuition, comprise a receptive capacity, i.e., a capacity to be 
affected in certain ways. In my view, it seems that space is no 
mere receptive form but an active source of knowledge, seated 
in the imagination. Now if we consider the active/passive 
division Kant makes between the two fundamental sources of 
knowledge, it seems that the distinction is really between 
spontaneous mental activity and receptive non-activity. Pre-
sumably, the central idea here is that there are two sources of 
knowledge: from one source we receive data upon which the 
other operates. The result is experience. Now, insofar as the 
objection above makes any sense at all, it is claimed that in 
my interpretation, space acts upon the data of experience, 
whereas Kant explicitly says that space is a manner of being 
affected. 
My response is that it is the imagination which is active 
in combining the data of the senses, while space merely repre-
sents the manner in which this combination takes place. 
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Space, in my view, then, need not be understood as an active 
capacity itself. 
There are two final points that should be made in con_ 
nection with my interpretation. There are a number of places 
in which Kant holds that space and time are produced or gen-
erated by a synthesis of the productive imagination. Here We 
must be careful to avoid being misled by an ambiguity in 
Kant's use of "space." Space, as form of intuition and under_ 
stood as a mental capacity, is not generated. I do not think 
such a claim would even make sense. On the other hand, Kant 
holds that a combination of appearances is represented as 
extended objects in space. The space in which things are 
located can be said to be produced as a result of the synthetic 
activity of the imagination. "Space" in the latter sense is caned 
"empirical space" (see Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science), the blueprint for which has its source in the imagina-
tion. 
Note that talk of the production of space is quite consis-
tent with the T .A. doctrine of space according to which space 
is originally given as a single unified and infmite manifold. 
Space, that is, does not consist of (spatial) parts that combine 
to form one, all-embracing space. Rather, space is an innate 
capacity of unification and, as such, each so-called empirical 
space produced represents one determinate result of this 
activity. To speak of empirical spaces, i.e., "different" spaces, 
presupposes some way of differentiating them. But obviously, 
since it makes no sense to talk of space as some object of 
awareness, empirical space (insofar as this phrase has meaning) 
simply denotes a certain position holding among the objects 
represented. Thus, to speak of different spaces as part of one 
all-embracing space is really elliptical for talk about situations 
of objects relative to one another, the possibility of which pre-
supposes that they are represented in a unified manner-3 
spatial manner. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant says that space is 
given, i.e., it is an intuition that "must be found in us prior 
to any perception of an object" (B41). This seems to suggest 
that space lies in us as an innate representation. In On a Dis-
covery According to which Any New Critique of Pure Reason 
Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (1790), Kant 
denies this: 
The Critique admits absolutely no divinely implanted or 
innate representation. It regards them all, whether they 
belong to intuition or not as acquired (Allison, 1973). 
The problem here is with the words "given" and "intui-
tion," which have misled some commentators. Kant claims 
that the objects of intuition are given to us as sensations. This, 
of course, does not mean that they are in any way innate. 
Sensations result from the affection of unknown things in 
themselves upon the senses. The use of the term "given" is 
presumably to emphasize that sensations are not the result of 
any mental activity. Certainly space is not "given" in this 
sense. If Kant is correct in 1790 about this doctrine of the 
Kritik, then space is not given in the sense of being an innate 
intuition. 
The meaning of "space as given" is made clear in Kant's 
1790 response to Eberhard: 
There must, however, be a ground in the subject which 
makes it possible for these representations to originate 
in this and no other manner, and which enables them to 
be related to objects which are not given. The ground 
at least is innate (Allison, 1973). 
The ground, of course, is the mental capacity to relate sensi-
ble items spatially. That which is generated, i.e., empirical 
space, when considered apart from empirical data, is space as 
a pure, homogeneous manifold which is originally acquired. 
But this original acquisition, i.e., space as a pure homogeneous 
manifold, leads us to Kant's doctrine of formal intuition, a 
topic requiring separate and detailed treatment. 
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